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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 





RESPOND·ENTS1 REPLY TO 
STATE OF UT AH1S PETITION 
FOR RE.HEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The State of Utah's Petition for rehearing and re-
consideration of this case should be denied for the follow-
mg reasons: 
I. 
THE PETITION FAILS TO STATE ANY 
GROUNDS UPON WHICH A REHEARING COULD 
PROPERLY BE GRANTED. 
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II. 
A DECISION RENDERED BY FOUR JUDGES 
IN A CASE HEARD BY A FULL COURT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHERE 
THE OTHER JUDGE DIED AFTER THE HEARING 
AND BEFORE THE DECISION. 
III. 
EXCHANGES OF THE KIND INVOLVED HERE 
LOGICALLY CAN BE MADE EITHER UNDER SEC-
TION 65-1-27 OR SECTION 65-1-70. 
IV. 
PETITIONER'S COMMENTS AS TO ACTION 
TAKEN BY 1959 LEGISLATURE ARE MEANING-
LESS AND SHOULD BE IGNORED. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PETITION FAILS TO STATE ANY 
GROUNDS UPON WHICH A REHEARING COULD 
PROPERLY BE GRANTED. 
The State's brief fails to raise any new points relative 
to the merits of this case or to cite any significant new 
authority. It is principally comprised of a re-argument 
of points and authorities which were thoroughly briefed 
and argued when the case was first submitted to the 
Court. From a reading of the majority and dissenting 
opinions, and from the fact that the Court had the mat-
ter under advisement for almost ten months before ren-
dering a decision, it is evident that all these points and 
arguments were carefully considered. In essence, there-
fore, the State's position is that the Court nevertheless 
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reached the wrong conclusion. It now seeks another op-
portunity to repeat the old arguments and authorities in 
the hope that the Court will reverse itself. While the 
reasons for the State's desire for a rehearing are apparent 
and understandable, it is equally clear that this desire alone, 
unsupported as it is by anything new, will not justify the 
granting of a rehearing. In Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 
483, 11 Pac. 618 ( 1886), the Court in denying a petition 
for rehearing said: 
The Petition for rehearing states no new 
facts or grounds for a reversal of the judgment of 
the lower court. It is mainly a re-argument of the 
case. We have repeatedly .called attention to the 
fact that no rehearing will be granted where noth-
ing new and important is offered for our con-
sideration. We again say that we cannot grant a 
rehearing unless a strong showing therefor be made. 
A re-argument, or an argument with the Court 
upon the points of the decision, with no new light 
given, is not such a showing. 
The fact that the decision was rendered by only four 
judges, occasioned by the death of Judge Worthen in the 
interval between the hearing and the decision, does not 
afford a valid basis for granting a rehearing. See State 
v. Sioux Falls Brewing Co., 5 S.D. 360, 58 N.W. 928 
(1894). There the South Dakota Supreme Court denied 
a petition for rehearing which was based upon the inter-
vening death of one of the judges who sat at the hearing 
and said in part: 
To recognize the change in personnel of the court 
as alone sufficient to require a re-argument would 
lead to the conclusion that intermediate the death 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
of Judge Bennett and the qualification of Judge 
Fuller this court could not decide any case, al-
though the surviving judges were agreed as to its 
decision. There seems to us no good reason for such 
a conclusion. 
The dissent by one of the surviving judges in this 
case is not a point of distinction from the Sioux Falls 
Brewing case because the surviving judges who joined in 
the majority opinion would have controlled the decision 
even had the deceased judge joined in the dissent. 
The State's contention that a decision by less than a 
full Court, absent a stipulation of the parties, violates 
Article VIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution-a con-
tention which does not go to the merits of the case-is 
discussed below in Point II. 
The only other reason given by the State to justify 
its Petition for rehearing is the following one stated in the 
conclusion of its brief: 
[T]he issues in this case have far reaching signi-
ficance and importance. At stake is nothing less 
than the right of the citizens of the State of Utah 
to a royalty interest in oil and gas and other mineral 
properties worth many millions of dollars. The 
chief beneficiaries of such rights are the public 
schools of the state, in part supported by the rev-
enues from state school sections involved in this 
dispute. 
While the State concedes that ((these considerations alone 
should not :~.~- :~.~- :>.'- be determinative of the outcome of 
the case" it concludes that uthey do constitute good rea-
son why this Court should arrive at a final judgment 
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5 
only after the most thorough and thoughtful judicial 
consideration of the issues presented." 
This contention is wholly without merit. There are 
few cases which have been decided by this Court and 
which have been as thoroughly briefed and argued. A 
total of six briefs were filed before the hearing and were 
available to the Court in reaching its decision. This total 
included three briefs prepared by the State (Appellant's 
brief, Appellant's reply brief and Appellant's reply to 
Amicus Curiae brief) and two briefs Amicus Curiae. At 
the hearing, oral arguments were made not only by counsel 
for Respondents and the Appellant, but also by counsel 
representing the United States as well as Honolulu Oil 
Corporation and The Superior Oil Company, the two 
Amicus Curiae. Thereafter, the Court considered the mat-
ter for almost ten months before rendering its decision. 
The lengthy dissenting opinion, which discusses all the 
issues involved in the case, and the carefully written ma-
jority opinion demonstrate that the Court considered the 
case carefully and in detail. 
II. 
A DECISIO·N RENDERED BY FOUR JUDGES 
IN A CASE HEARD BY A FULL COURT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHERE 
THE OTHER JUDGE DIED AFTER THE HEARING 
AND BEFORE THE DECISION. 
In its POINT IV, the State cites Article VIII, Section 
2, of the Utah Constitution* for the proposition that a 
*"~e supreme court shall consist of fi~e judges, which number may 
be mcreased or decreased by the legtslature, but no alteration or 
increase shall have the effect of removing a judge from office. A major-
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decision by the Utah Supreme Court must be by five 
judges, and not four judges. It is contended that the· pro-
vision that ((if a justice of the supreme court shall be 
disq'ualified from sitting in a cause before said court, the 
remaining judges shall call a district judge to sit with 
them on the hearing of such cause" makes such an inter-
pretation mandatory, despite additional language in this 
section to the effect that u[a] majority of the judges con-
stituting the court shall be necessary to form a quorum 
or render a decision." It is submitted that this construc-
tion is unwarranted. 
Clearly a decision by a quorum of less than five 
justices was contemplated. The language of this section 
must be so interpreted if all of its provisions are to be 
given effect. 
Similar constitutional provisions have been given this 
interpretation consistently by courts in other jurisdic-
tions. E.g. Dolley v. Ragon, 76 Cal. App. 140, 243 Pac. 
893 (1926) (A quorum of two on a Supreme Court 
regularly composed of three justices was permitted to act 
despite Cal. Const. Art. VI, Section 3: ulf a vacancy 
occur in the office of a justice, the Governor shall appoint 
ity of the judges constituting the court shall be necessary to form a 
quorum or render a decision. If a justice of the supreme court shall 
be disqualified from sitting in a cause before said court, the remaining 
judges shall call a district judge to sit with them on the hearing of 
such cause. Every judge of the supreme court shall be at least thirty 
years of age, an active member of the bar, in good standing, learned 
in the law, and a resident of the State of Utah for the five years next 
preceding his selection. The judge having the shortest term to serve, 
not holding his office by selection to :fill a vacancy before expiration 
of a regular term, shall be the chief justice, and shall preside at all 
terms of the Supreme Court, and in case of his absence, the judge, 
having in like manner, the next shortest term, shall preside in his 
stead." (As amended November 7, 1944, effective January 1, 1945;) 
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a person to hold the office until the election and qualifica-
tion of a justice to fill the vacancy.") Furthermore, this 
Constitutional provision could not preclude a decision by 
a mere quorum of the Court in those situations where one 
judge present at the hearing of the cause does not parti-
cipate in its decision by reason of his intervening death, 
because it provides only for the calling of a district judge 
to usit" on the ((hearing" of the case. 
A. The quorum requirement. 
The Petitioner argues that although the Constitution 
provides that a mere majority of the Supreme Court 
justices shall constitute a quorum, it is nevertheless not 
constitutionally possible for a lesser number than five to 
render a decision in any cause, except upon stipulation of 
the parties. It must therefore also be the contention of 
the Petitioners that absent such a stipulation the powers 
of a quorum would be limited to routine daily transactions 
dealing with the administrative functions of the Court. 
But where the meaning of the word ((quorum" has been 
placed in question, it has not been so interpreted. In 
Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18, 31 Pac. 716 (1892) the 
court was squarely faced with the determination of 
whether a ((quorum" as provided in Colorado Constitution 
Article VI, Section 5 Ccthe Supreme Court shall consist 
of three judges, a majority of whom shall be necessary to 
form a quorum or pronounce a decision."), would be per-
mitted to decide a case in the absence of one of its mem-
bers. The word's etymological derivation was considered 
and it was concluded that it refers to the number of per-
sons who may lawfully act. The .court noted that the 
language of the Colorado Constitution was substantially 
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similar to the language regulating the United States Su-
preme Court, which provides that the court shall be com-
posed of nine judges with a quorum of six entitled to act 
and then said: 
Hence, if the construction contended for by 
appellant be correct, then the United States Su-
preme Court can never transact any business during 
a vacancy occasioned by the death or resignation 
of any one of the nine judges provided for by the 
act constituting said court. It is a matter of com-
mon information that numerous vacancies have 
occurred in that body during the last quarter of a 
century, and such vacancies have continued for 
months at a time, and yet during the period of 
such vacancies, the court has gone on exercising 
it full jurisdiction in the decision of pending cases. 
A vacancy is liable to occur at any time in this 
court. Such vacancy may continue weeks or even 
months * * *. The consequences might be very 
serious if the court were to be held practically 
disorganized or incapacitated from transacting 
business during such vacancy. Fortunately, there 
seems to be no good reason for arriving at such 
conclusion. 
The holding of the Utah court in Nephi Irrigatio1t Co. v. 
]e11kins, 8 Utah 452, 32 Pac. 699 (1893) (discussed be-
low) is consistent with the position adopted in Colorado. 
B. T be general effect of death or other disqualifica-
tion upon the pou/crs of a judicial body to act. 
Petitioners correctly cite In re Tbompson's Estate, 72 
Utah 17, 86, 269 Pac. 103, 128 (1928) for the proposition 
uthat (disqualification' may include the death of a judge." 
They then incorrectly, and without citing authorities sup-
porting their contention, assert that such a udisquali:fica-
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tion" has the effect of incapacitating the court in 
determining any cause previously heard and yet pending 
before it. The numerous following cited cases stand in 
contradiction of Petitioner's contention. No case involving 
the question has been found which supports Petitioner's 
contention. 
In Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Jenkins, supra, in inter-
preting 25 U.S. St. at Large, p. 203::·, it was held that the 
quorum requirement related only to the number of jus-
tices who must be present when action was to be taken 
and the power of the Court to render a decision was not 
impaired even though at the time of decision a judge, 
whose presence was necessary to form a quorum, was dis-
qualified to participate in the decision because he had 
tried the case below. 
In rejecting the contention that the disqualified judge 
could not be used to form a quorum, and in holding that 
the two qualified judges could effectively decide the case 
even though, alone, they would not have comprised a 
quorum, the Court stated: 
[A] ny other construction would render the court 
powerless to act in many cases brought before it. 
Under the contention claimed by respondent the 
sickness or absence of one of the justices would 
render it impossible to obtain a quorum so as to 
transact business, although it would be competent 
for two concurring justices, when three constitute 
a quorum, to render an opinion. If the disqualified 
---
''"The supreme court consists of a chief justice and three associate 
justices, any three of whom shall constitute a quorum, but no justice 
sha~l act as a member of the supre~e court in any action or pro-
cedmg brought to .s~ch ~ourt by wnt of error, bill of exception, or 
appeal from a declSlon, JUdgment, or decree rendered by him as a 
judge of the district court." 
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justice cannot constitute one of the quorum with-
out acting, the two remaining justices would be 
powerless to act. 
See also Ets-Hokin v. Appellant Department of Superior 
Court, 42 Cal. App. 2d 326, 108 P. 2d 943 (1941) (Only 
two of three judges heard the cause) ; Dolley v. Ragon, 
supra (cause heard by three judges, one of whom deemed 
himself disqualified); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
People, 68 Colo. 487, 190 Pac. 513 (1920); Snider v. 
Rinehart, supra, (case decided during vacancy due to resig-
nation of one judge); Stanton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 
25 Wyo. 138, 167 Pac. 709 (1917); Gibbs v. Milk Control 
Board, 185 Ga. 844, 196 S. E. 296 (1936); State v. Neu, 
180 La. 545, 157 So. 105 (1934); Platt v. Shields, 96 Vt. 
257, 119 Ad. 520 (1923); International & Longshore-
mans' & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. 
Pa. 1949) reversed on other grounds, 187 F. 2d 860, cert 
den. 342 U. S. 859; Eagerton v. Graves, 252 Ala. 326, 40 
So. 2d 417 (1949); CQ'mmonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 
33, 16 A. 2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Gregory, 146 
A. 2d 624 (Penn. 1958). Cf. Bracey v. Gray, 71 Cal. App. 
2d 206, 162 P. 2d 314 (1945) (district court of appeal 
which is regularly composed of three members is not 
illegally constituted if one is disqualified, since only two 
are necessary to render a decision) . 
The rule established by these cases permitting a court 
to act following the disqualification of one of its members, 
if a quorum is otherwise present (or in the case of Nephi 
Irrigation Co. v. Jenkins where the disqualified member is 
necessary to form a quorum) is not changed by provisions 
for the designation of a judge to take the place of one 
who is incapacitated. Dolley v. Ragon; supra, Johnson v. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Walls, 18 5 Ga. 177, 194 S. E. 3 80; /¥-etropolitan: Water 
Dist. v. Adams, 19 Cal. 2d 463, 122 P. 2d 257 (1942). 
C. The State has impliedly consented to a decision 
by four judges. 
If, despite the clear weight of the above case law to 
the contrary, it were to be determined that there is some 
legal merit in the State's present claims, it nevertheless 
appears that the State would be unable to raise such a 
contention at this time. The disqualification by death 
which the State now complains of occurred approximately 
four months prior to the announcement of the Court's 
decision. If the State of Utah objected to the remaining 
members of the Supreme Court deciding the case, it was 
incumbent that it make its objections known promptly 
and its silence during the interim can only be construed 
as an implied consent that the surviving four judges de-
cide. In Stanton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 25 Wyo. 138, 
167 Pac. 709 (1917) the court was faced with a similar 
situation. In disposing of a petition for rehearing on the 
grounds that the cause was heard by only two of three 
justices, the court observed that it was originally argued 
before only two justices and that the plaintiff was aware 
of the illness of the third judge. When the judge died 
without having opportunity to participate in the court's 
decision, the court held on the petition for rehearing that 
the action of the petitioner would preclude him from 
objecting in view of his knowledge of the situation. 
Similarly, in this case the State had knowledge of the 
((disqualification" of one of the Judges long before the 
Court's decision was announced. Its delay in raising an 
objection until after the opinion had been announced indi-
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cates that it objects only to the manner in which the case 
was resolved, and not to the composition of the court. The 
State's delay must now preclude it raising this argument 
merely to obtain a rehearing on the merits. 
III. 
EXCHANGES OF THE KIND INVOLVED HERE 
LOGICALLY CAN BE MADE EITHER UNDER SEC-
TION 65-1-27 OR SECTION 65-1-70. 
The State's brief, by a rather involved and uncon-
vincing process of reasoning, infers that the Court's con-
clusion that the State Land Board had authority to make 
exchanges of the kind involved here was based solely upon 
§ 65-1-14 U. C. A. 1953. This inference was drawn not-
withstanding the clear statement of the court that nsuch 
authority must be found in §§ 65-1-14, 65-1-27, and 
65-1-70 U. C. A. 1953." Having eliminated, to its satis-
faction, §§ 65-1-27 and 65-1-70, the State then argues as 
if no other statute than § 65-1-14 was involved. The 
State's self interest in this litigation has blinded it to the 
fact that either § 65-1-27 or § 65-1-70 can be reasonably 
interpreted as authorizing and permitting these exchanges. 
A. The provisions of Section 65-1-27 authorize the 
State to exchange lands with the United States. 
Section 65-1-27 U. C. A. 1953 provides as follows: 
Selection of state lands-Relinquishment.-All se-
lections of land shall be made in legal subdivisions 
according to the United States survey, and when a 
selection has been made and approved by the board, 
it shall take such action as may be necessary to 
secure the approval of the proper officer of the 
United States and the final transfer to this state of 
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the lands selected. The board may cancel, relin-
quish or release the claims of the state to, and may 
reconvey to the United States, any particular tract 
of land erroneously listed to the state, or any tract 
upon which, at the ~ime of selection, a bona fide 
claim has been initiated by an actual settler. 
It is significant that in quoting from § 65-1-27 at page 4 
of its brief, the State neglects to quote the first sentence 
of the section which, in reference to the making of in-
demnity selections, directs that the State ((shall take such 
action as may be necessary to secure the approval of the 
proper officers of the United States and the final transfer 
to this State of the lands selected." This section clearly 
confers upon the Land Board authority to pass minerals 
to the United States in selection exchanges of this kind 
since one of the conditions of making a valid selection 
under the Federal Statutes is that the State waive all its 
rights in the land used as base. 
As was pointed out in California v. Desert Water Oil 
and Irrigation Company, 243 U. S. 214, 37 S. Ct. 394 
(1917) the states had, prior to the decision, consistently 
made selections under the Federal school indemnity stat-
utes, both in cases where the base land had and had not 
vested in the state, and the case affirmed this right. Sec-
tion 6 5-1-27 was passed by our Legislature in 18 9 9, sev-
eral years after the Federal Statutes were passed, and at 
a time when the practice of making indemnity selections 
had become well established and thereafter selections were 
made under it both in cases where title to the base land 
had and had not vested in the State. Under these cir-
cumstances, the enactment of the statute of May 12, 1919 
(§ 65-1-15, U. C. A. 1953), could not, in the absence of 
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express language to that effect, be interpreted as preventing 
selection exchanges under § 65-1-27. The second sentence 
in§ 65-1-27 relating to lands erroneously listed to the State 
or on which a bona fide claim has been initiated by an 
actual settler which is referred to by the State is obviously 
intended to grant additional powers upon the State Land 
Board. Grammatically, this language is separated from the 
preceding provision referred to, and is in no way intended 
to qualify it. 
B. The provisions of Section 65-1-70 authorize the 
State to exchange lands with the United States. 
Section 65-1-70 U. C. A. 1953 provides as follows: 
Exchange of lands between board and proprietors. 
-In order to compact, as far as practicable, the 
land holdings of the state, the board is hereby au-
thorized to exchange any of the land held by the 
state for other land of equal value within the state, 
held by other proprietors; and upon request of the 
board the governor is hereby authorized to execute 
and deliver the necessary patents to such other 
proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of 
the land so exchanged; provided, that no exchange 
shall be made by the land board until the patent for 
the lands so received in exchange shall have been 
issued to such proprietors or their grantors. 
It is evident that there are two critical prerequisites to the 
application of this section to the exchange of State lands 
with the United States: (a) The purpose of the exchange 
should be to compact State holdings, and (b) the equiv-
alent of the udeed" or Hpatent" from the United States 
or its grantees covering the exchanged land selected should 
be involved. Both of these conditions are apparently 
satisfied. 
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Prior to the time of exchange with the United States, 
the subject land was ((hedged in" and isolated within a 
national forest. This made the land difficult to use and 
unattractive to prospective purchasers from the State. By 
entering into the sele.ction exchange involved here, the 
State was able to acquire other lands so compacted in 
reference to other lands available for use in the State that 
they were attractive to prospective purchasers. The chief 
value to the State of its lands consists in the producing of 
revenue by the sale or lease thereof. With but rare ex-
ceptions, the only utilization of State lands is that made 
by the State's grantees or lessees. This being true, the fact 
that the lands acquired by the State under the selection 
were soon sold does not alter the conclusion that the ex-
change was made to compact the State's land holdings in 
the sense above indicated. 
There was the equivalent of a ((deed" or ((patent" 
covering the Federal government lands involved. Upon and 
by virtue of approval of the selection, passing of legal 
title as to the base lands from the State to the United 
States and as to the selected lands from the United States 
to the State was accomplished. This was in accordance 
with applicable Federal legislation. It has been repeatedly 
held in Interior Department decisions that approval of a 
selection passes title to the lands ((as completely as if trans-
ferred by patent." See Reid v. State of Mississippi, 3 0 L. 
D. 230 (1900). It is thus apparent that at the time of 
the selection exchange, the government of the United 
States was the (Cproprietor" within the contemplation of 
§ 65-1-70 U. C. A. 1953 and that the approval of the 
selection was. the equivalent of a deed or patent. 
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IV. 
PETITIONER'S COMMENTS AS TO ACTION 
TAKEN BY THE 1959 LEGISLATURE ARE MEAN-
INGLESS AND SHOULD BE IGNORED. 
In reference to§ 65-1-15 U.C.A. 1953, the Petitioner 
correctly notes at page 8 of its brief that the 1959 Session 
of the Utah Legislature re-enacted said§ 65-1-15 in Chap-
ter 131, Laws of Utah 1959, adding a provision author-
izing the State Land Board to release minerals in the base 
lands in selection exchanges with the United States. The 
Petitioner fails to note, however, that in Chapter 132 
which follows, the same Legislature on the same day re-
enacted said § 65-1-15 a second time, eliminating the 
proviso. Under these circumstances, the comments of 
Petitioner as to the significance of what the 1959 Legis-
lature did are meaningless. In any event, it is the province 
of this Court, not the Legislature, to interpret the mean-
ing of the applicable statutes, and even had the proviso 
not been eliminated by the second re-enactment, the 
Court, in interpreting statutory meaning, should attach no 
significance to a proviso added by the Legislature approxi-
mately four months after the case was argued and sub-
mitted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the State's Petition for rehearing should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Richfield, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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